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Abstract 
While the European Parliament’s two largest political groups, the European People’s Party 
and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, have been used to sharing its 
presidency, they decided to fight with each other in January 2017 during the mid-term 
election. The S&D, indeed, decided to break the coalition agreement they had signed with 
the EPP after the 2014 European elections. Media and commentators talked about the end of 
the grand coalition and predicted a new era of decision-making, more political and 
conflictual. This study aims at analysing the evolution of coalition formation since the end 
of the 2014 coalition agreement. It uses both quantitative data (roll-call votes in plenary 
between 2014 and December 2017) and qualitative data (interviews). The grand coalition 
has remained determining for adopting legislation and non-legislation but has been activated 
less often when it comes to non-legislative amendments. Moreover, we found that the end 
of the agreement mostly impacted policy areas that were already conflictual in the past. We 
assume that coalition formation in the European Parliament is affected by institutional, inter-
institutional and conjectural constraints, regardless of the deal signed between the three 
centrist political groups. In other words, the coalition agreement has only been a reference 
framework that justified cooperation practises already existing before the 2014.  
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Introduction 
In January 2017, the new President of the European Parliament (EP), Antonio Tajani 
(European People’s Party, EPP), was elected after four rounds of voting, and with the 
opposition of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). This competition 
was unusual, since the two largest political groups have been used to sharing the presidency 
consensually. The reason for this contested election is the decision made by the S&D group to 
break the 2014 understanding agreement between centrist groups, which stated that both the 
S&D and the EPP would get one president between 2014 and 2019. 
While there have always been agreements for the sharing of the spoils, including the 
2014 deal, the latter was more structuring. The content of the agreement was limited, but the 
political dynamics around it, notably the election of the Juncker Commission, formalised and 
strengthened the grand coalition narrative. As outlined by the media, Jean-Claude Juncker was 
elected by the EP after coalition negotiations 1  and “after setting out a ‘grand coalition’ 
investment programme”.2 The need to legitimate the Spitzenkandidaten procedure vis-à-vis 
the Council, as well as the rise of Eurosceptic forces in the hemicycle, pressured the leaders 
of centrist groups to establish a quasi-formal alliance.3 In this context, the conflict between 
the two main groups in 2017, and the very contested mid-term election, have led some4 to 
believe that the grand coalition was over, and that “adversarial politics [was] entering 
Europe”.5The EU political system and the nature of political conflict within institutions have 
                                                 
1 N. Peñalver García & J. Priestley, The Making of a European President, London, Palgrave, 2015, p. 163. 
2 T. Körkemeier, “EU's Juncker wins approval with 'grand coalition' program”, Reuters, 15 July 2014, retrieved 
21 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-commission-juncker/eus-juncker-wins-approval-with-
grand-coalition-program-idUSKBN0FK0R420140715. 
3  T. Christiansen, “After the Spitzenkandidaten: fundamental change in the EU's political system?", West 
European Politics, vol. 39, no. 5, 2016, pp. 992-1010. 
4 C. De Marcilly, “European Parliament: redistribution of political balance”, Fondation Robert Schuman, 2017, 
retrieved 21 April 2017, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0420-european-parliament-
redistribution-of-political-balance; A. Eriksson, “New EU Parliament coalitions get in shape”, EU Observer, 20 
January 2017, retrieved 1 May 2018, https://euobserver.com/institutional/136612; and S&D MEP Tanja Fajon, 
quoted in “'Grand Coalition' in over – Is that good for Europe?”, EuranetPlus, 18 January 2017, retrieved 21 
April 2018, https://euranetplus-inside.eu/grand-coalition-is-over-is-that-good-for-europe/. 
5 Ibid. 
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been analysed by EU studies. In a system considered as consociational,6 the two legislators 
(European Parliament and Council of the EU) need to pass the law with important majorities, 
favouring status quo outcomes7 and encouraging actors to build intra- and inter-institutional 
alliances. Within the EP, consensus-building processes have become the norm, and MEPs need 
to endorse a compromise-oriented role if they want to be given important positions.8 The 
consensual nature of decision-making led some to think that the Union is lacking political 
competition.9 Yet, this conclusion derives from studies that focus on final votes and does not 
consider conflict occurring during other steps of the decision-making process.10 Although the 
system can be considered as consensual, there has been a shift toward politicised 
confrontation: 11  voting behaviour has been increasingly determined by the left-right 
cleavage,12 even though recent studies emphasised the relevance of the integration cleavage.13   
Coalition studies found that there are two main explanations for coalition formation: 
rational (to secure some benefits) and ideological (to adopt laws).14 Scholars found that these 
two explanations apply to coalition formation within the European Parliament.15 As for the 
grand coalition, there have been several explanations in the literature. 16  First, the grand 
                                                 
6 O. Costa & P. Magnette, “The European Union as consociation? A methodological assessment”, West European 
Politics, vol. 26, no. 3, 2003, pp. 1-18. 
7 G. Tsebelis & G. Garrett, “Legislative Politics in the European Union”, European Union Politics, vol. 1, no.1, 
2000, pp. 9-36. 
8 S. Bendjaballah, Des illusions perdues ? Du compromis au consensus au Parlement européen et à la chambre 
des représentants américaine, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2016, p. 18. 
9 P. Mair, “Political opposition and the European Union”, Government and Opposition, vol. 42, no. 1, 2007, pp. 
1-17. 
10 L. Roger, S. Otjes & H. van der Veer, “The financial crisis and the European Parliament: An analysis of the 
Two-Pack legislation”, European Union Politics, vol. 18, no. 4, 2017, pp. 560-580. 
11 A. Kreppel & S. Hix, “From ‘grand coalition’ to left-right confrontation. Explaining the shifting structure of 
party competition in the European Parliament”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 1/2, 2003, pp. 75-96. 
12 S. Hix, A. Kreppel & A. Noury, “The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, 2003, pp. 309-331. More recent study: S. Otjes & H. van der 
Veer, “The Eurozone crisis and the European Parliament's changing lines of conflict”, European Union Politics, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 2016, pp. 242-261. 
13 G. McElroy & K. Benoit, “Policy positioning in the European Parliament”, European Union Politics, vol. 13, 
no. 1, 2011, pp. 150-167. More recent study: C. Moury & E. de Giogi, “Conflict and Consensus in Parliament 
during the Economic Crisis”, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2015, pp. 1-13. 
14 W. Riker, The theory of political  coalitions, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962. 
15 S. Hix, A. Noury & G. Roland, Democratic Politics in the European Union, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 149-59. 
16 For a review of these explanations, see S. Hix, A. Kreppel & A. Noury, op. cit. 
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coalition can be explained by ideological similarity between the S&D and the EPP, which are 
both pro-European parties. 17  Secondly, coalition dynamics can be explained by the 
constraining procedural rules (absolute majority in second reading).18 Thirdly, political groups 
would tend to adopt legislation with a broad majority in order to increase the influence of the 
EP vis-à-vis other institutions, which explains why the grand coalition increased after 1987, 
when the Parliament was evolving into a legislative chamber.19 Lastly, the coalition can be 
explained by the interest the two largest centrist groups have in securing influence in the 
internal working of the Parliament and in limiting the power of smaller groups. 
Moreover, coalition formation in the EP can also be explained by rational choice 
institutionalism and constructivism. First, rational choice institutionalism explains that stable 
majorities can be found for legislation because of the rules that has been adopted for 
committees or the whole house.20 The developments of these organisational forms is due to 
the effort to reduce the transaction costs of making deals. Second, constructivism, which is 
derived from international relations studies, stresses the role of social structures and 
sociological forces that “bound” actors, who for instance tend to interiorise rules and norms 
and therefore tends to be sticky. 21  From a constructivist perspective, social facts are 
constructed in different ways by actors, and in return affect discourses and relations between 
groups. We argue that all these approaches are relevant to explain the dynamics around the 
grand coalition in the European Parliament. When interpreting the results, this paper does not 
analyse these approaches independently from each other but refer to all of them in order to 
explain the three constraints on coalition formation: institutional, inter-institutional and 
                                                 
17 S. Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, op. cit. 
18 Article 294 TFEU. 
19 A. Kreppel, “Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament”, European Union Politics, 
vol. 1, no. 3, 2000, pp. 340-362. 
20 K. Shepsle, “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach”, Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 131-147. 
21 A. Kreppel & S. Hix, “From ‘grand coalition’ to left-right confrontation. Explaining the shifting structure of 
party competition in the European Parliament”, op. cit.  
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conjunctural. Indeed, within each of these constraints, coalition formation cannot be explained 
by a single approach: at the inter-institutional level, for instance, ideological similarity 
(ideology) and sociological forces (constructivism) between institutions might affect coalition 
formation, as well as the rules and norms governing the legislative process that has been 
developed over time to reduce transaction costs (rational choice institutionalism).  
Discourses about entering a more conflictual area should be taken with caution. Indeed, 
the cooperation between the main centrist groups had pre-existed the signing of the 2014 
agreement, and a cooperative habit has developed over time.22 If cooperation between the 
political groups has been a constant feature of the EP, has the decision-making process within 
the EP really became more conflictual after the breakdown of the 2014 agreement? Which 
factors can explain the continuing building of grand coalitions? And what were the reasons for 
and the meaning of the 2014 coalition agreement? This research focuses on the evolution of 
coalition-making dynamics and how continuity or discontinuity can be explained. We assume 
that there have not been major changes since the end of the 2014 agreement when political 
groups vote on legislative and non-legislative reports. The hypothesis is summarised below:  
H: Legislative and non-legislative reports have continued to be adopted by the grand 
coalition, even after the end of the 2014 agreement. 
 
  
                                                 
22 J. Priestley, “Coalitions: Grand or Grubby?”, Julian Priestley, 8 January 2017, retrieved 21 April 2018, 
http://julianpriestley.eu/coalitions-grand-grubby/  
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Data and methodology 
Quantitative and qualitative data 
The quantitative dataset used for this paper is made of roll-call votes23 (RCVs) from 
2014 until December 2017. This paper analyses two types of acts: non-legislative (own 
initiative reports), and legislative acts (ordinary legislative procedure), leaving aside 
consultation and budgetary procedures, and resolutions on topical subjects. The total number 
of analysed votes is 5,078 (79.62% of the number of extracted votes). The disaggregation of 
data by procedure enabled us to avoid comparing different situations24 and to analyse the 
independent variables that can impact the outcome of coalition-formation (legislators tend to 
adopt different positions and strategies depending on the procedure).25 The dataset was also 
divided according to the parliamentary committee in which the file was discussed. Since the 
compromise emerging in the plenary is constrained by the nature of negotiations in the 
committee, 26  it is relevant to analyse the impact that coalition-building practices in 
committees27 may have on coalition formation in plenary.  
As for the qualitative dataset, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with ten 
persons working within the European Parliament (Members of the EP, European political 
groups' Secretary General, staff working within the Parliamentary Work Unit of political 
groups, and staff working in parliamentary committees). The diversity of the interviewees can 
be both an advantage and a disadvantage: it reduced the sample size by category but provided  
different viewpoints, mirroring the diversity of actors within the EP. Since the focus of this 
study is the evolution of the grand coalition, interviews have been conducted with 
                                                 
23  European Parliament Public Register of Documents, retrieved on 2 May 2018, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/search/typedoc.htm?codeTypeDocu=PPVD&leg=8. 
24 C. Carruba et al., “A Second Look at Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament. Roll-Call Votes and 
the Party System”, Political Science Series, no. 94, 2004. 
25 B. Høyland, “Procedural and party effects in European Parliament roll-call votes”, European Union Politics, 
vol. 11, no. 4, 2010, pp. 597-613. 
26 N. Yordanova, Organising the European Parliament: the Role of Committees and their Legislative Influence, 
Colchester, ECPR Press, 2013. 
27  P. Settembri & C. Neuhold, “Achieving consensus through committees. Does the European Parliament 
manage?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 47, no. 1, 2009, pp. 127-151. 
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representatives from the three groups member of the coalition, plus a representative from the 
Greens-EFA. The interviews provided information on both the ground-level experience of 
actors and the representation and meaning they give to social facts, like the coalition 
agreement. In this way, the qualitative aspect of the research can help close the gap left by the 
study of roll-call votes,28 since interviews can enable us to look at the bigger picture and to 
explain how voting behaviour (macroscopic scale) is shaped by formal and informal rules and 
practices (microscopic scale) and by the meaning of the coalition agreement (constructivism). 
Methodology 
Studies using roll-call votes from the EP found that that political groups are more 
significant than nationality for understanding MEPs’ voting behaviour,29 increasing, therefore, 
group cohesion30 and confirming the policy approach of coalition formation.31 To sum up, 
RCV-based studies have drawn conclusions about the development of a European level-party 
system and led scholars to consider the EP a “normal parliament”.32 Yet, the use of RCVs tend 
to be biased, since it does not give the opportunity to select votes randomly.33 Roll-call votes 
are requested by groups to either discipline their members34 or signal the position of the group 
(or of another group) to an external audience. 35  Conclusions build on these data should 
therefore be taken with caution. The research method in this paper will be descriptive, 
comparing the likelihood of each coalition configuration over time. Coalition formation is 
                                                 
28 M. K. Rasmussen, “Another Side of the Story: A Qualitative Case Study of Voting Behaviour in the European 
Parliament”, Politics, vol. 28, no. 1, 2008, pp. 11-18. 
29 A. Kreppel & G. Tsebelis, “Coalition Formation in the European Parliament”, Comparative Political Stucies, 
vol. 32, no. 8, 1999, pp. 933-966; more recently S. Hix, “Parliamentary Behaviour with Two Principals: 
Legislator Preferences, Parties and Voting in the European Parliament”, American Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 46, no. 3, 2002, pp. 688-698. 
30 S. Hix, A. Noury & G. Roland, op. cit, p. 94. 
31  T. Raunio, The European Perspective: The Transnational Party Groups in the 1989-1994 European 
Parliament, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997. 
32 S. Hix, A. Noury & G. Roland, “A ‘Normal’ Parliament? Party Cohesion and Competition in the European 
Parliament, 1979-2001”, European Parliament Research Group, Working Paper, no. 9. 
33 C. Carruba et al., op. cit. 
34 C. Carruba, M. Gabel & S. Hug, “Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll-Call Vote 
Selection”, Legislative Studies Quaterly, vol. 33, no. 4, 2008, pp. 543-572. 
35  J. Thiem, “Explaining Roll Call Vote Request in the European Parliament”, Mannheimer Zentrum für 
Europäische Sozialforschung, Working Paper, no. 90, 2006.  
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calculated on the basis of voting similarity, which is defined as follows: two groups vote in 
the same way when the majority of members from group 1 casting a vote has the same position 
(yes, no, abstention) as the majority of members from group 2 casting a vote. The likelihood 
of a coalition configuration is the share of a given coalition that has been activated over a given 
period, with respect to the total number of votes over the same period. Four different coalitions 
have been studied: 
1. EPP/S&D/ALDE, where EPP = S&D = ALDE; 
2. EPP/S&D, where EPP = S&D ≠ ALDE; 
3. EPP/ALDE, where EPP = ALDE ≠ S&D; 
4. S&D/ALDE, where S&D = ALDE ≠ S&D. 
This categorisation enables us to exclude some groups (we can study the likelihood of 
the EPP/S&D coalition when ALDE members oppose it) and, unlike cooperation rates,36 
provides us with information concerning the different coalition configurations used by 
political groups.   
 
The impact of the deal: limited changes in decision-making since January 2017 
Coalition formation: stability of the grand coalition 
Coalitions are crucial in the European Parliament: since the first elected Parliament, 
no group has been able to secure a majority of seats by its own. In order to test our first 
hypothesis that reports have continued to be adopted by the grand coalition even after the end 
of the 2014 deal, we make three sub-hypotheses. Firstly, we assume that the proportion of final 
texts adopted by the grand coalition has remained rather stable. Secondly, since there has 
always been more conflict on amendments, we hypothesis that the proportion of amendments 
adopted by the grand coalition has decreased. Lastly, we assume that the breakdown of the 
coalition has not affected coalition-building for texts drafted in committees used to 
                                                 
36 D. Cherepnalkoski et al., op. cit. 
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compromise-making. If this last hypothesis is true, it would confirm the fact that coalition 
formation very much depends on the informal rules (practices, socialisation, and interpersonal 
relations) of committees. 
  EPP/S&D/ALDE EPP/S&D EPP/ALDE S&D/ALDE 
Sections Pre-2017 62.08% 3.35% 22.68% 11.90% 
Post-2017 62.69% 2.59% 18.65% 16.06 
Evolution +1% 
(0.94) 
-22.7% 
(1) 
-17.8% 
(0.48) 
+35% 
(0.34) 
Final text Pre-2017 96.33% 0.92% 1.83% 0.92% 
Post-2017 86.21% 0% 0% 10.34% 
Evolution -10.5% 
(0.08) 
- 
(1) 
- 
(1) 
+1,028% 
(0.06) 
Table 1: Evolution of coalition formation for legislation. 
The data show that the impact of the breakdown of the coalition agreement has been 
quite limited on legislation (Table 1). The statistical significance of the difference between 
the two periods is very low, meaning that one cannot know whether the evolution between two 
periods is caused by chance or not. This supports our hypothesis that there has not been change 
in coalition formation (on legislation) after January 2017. Still, some downwards trends would 
need further research: the three centrist groups cooperated in 96.33% of the cases before 
January 2017, against 86.21% after 2017, and the two alternative coalitions have been more 
volatile than the grand coalition. Three legislative files37 were won by a left-wing coalition 
after the mid-term election. These texts were mandates given by the plenary to the responsible 
committee to open inter-institutional negotiations. We assume that it might be easier for a 
group to oppose a negotiating mandate in plenary, rather than the final first-reading report. 
The argument that the Parliament would try to get the broadest majority possible in order in 
increase its power vis-à-vis the Council of the EU should therefore be reconsidered. Even 
                                                 
37 European Parliament, “Multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting 
those stocks”, P8_TA(2017)0357, 2017; European Parliament, “Report on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data 
in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC”, A8-0324/2017, 2017; European Parliament, 
“Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 24 October 2017 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the making available on the market of CE marked 
fertilising products and amending Regulations (EC) No 1069/2009 and (EC) No 1107/2009”, A8-0270/2017. 
9 
 
though there has not been major change for legislation, decision-making is not always 
consensual. One legislative file 38  adopted during in 2017 was supported by none of the 
coalitions studied in this paper (neither S&D or ALDE explicitly supported the EPP, which 
adopted the text with the support of ECR, ENF and non-attached MEPs). The vote was about 
giving a mandate to the responsible committee for negotiations, and we can doubt that a final 
first-reading text would have had been approved by such a narrow majority (53.3% of the 
votes in favour).  
We can assume that this coalition was possible for two reasons. Firstly, since it is not 
likely that the legislation would go to second reading (in our dataset, only 10% of legislation), 
groups are not pressured to reach from the beginning a supermajority. Secondly, the strategy 
of the EPP can count on the division within other groups (S&D and ALDE cohesion rates were 
significantly low). It is important to distinguish between legislative and non-legislative 
reports, since MEPs tend to vote differently. This paper only studies initiative reports and not 
resolutions, since the two are not drafted in the same way.39 Like for legislation, there have 
not been major changes after the end of the agreement for adopting final non-legislative files 
(Table 2), even though the three centrist groups did not need large majorities in order to 
negotiate with the Council. These findings confirms the hypothesis that legislative and non-
legislative texts have continued to be adopted by the grand coalition after the breakdown of 
the deal. 
  
                                                 
38 European Parliament, “Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of 
broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes”, A8-0378/2017, 2017. 
39 O. Costa, Le Parlement européen, assemblée délibérante, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 
2001, p. 441. 
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  EPP/S&D/ALDE EPP/S&D EPP/ALDE S&D/ALDE 
Sections Pre-2017 63.92% 7.95% 13.02 14.43 
Post-2017 53.62 2.77% 20.85% 22.13% 
Evolution -16.1% 
(<0.001***) 
-65.2% 
(<0.001***) 
+60.1% 
(<0.001***) 
+53.4% 
(<0.001***) 
Final text Pre-2017 86.85% 3.76% 1.88% 7.04% 
Post-2017 85.83% 3.94% 0.79% 8.66% 
Evolution -1.2% 
(0.89) 
+4.8% 
(1) 
-58% 
(1) 
+23% 
(0.74) 
Table 2: Evolution of coalition formation for initiative reports. 
Although the grand coalition has remained decisive for adopting final texts, we assume 
that there have been changes regarding sections (amendments, paragraphs, recitals). As for 
legislation, Table 1 (p. 8) shows that coalition formation has not changed when MEPs vote 
sections of a text, rejecting our hypothesis that the grand coalition has decreased on 
amendments and paragraphs. Still, the aggregation by year (Figure 1, p. 11) shows that the 
share of amendments adopted by the S&D and EPP (without ALDE) has dropped in 2017, 
while the proportion of centre-right amendments has increased (even if this is not statistically 
significant). This might be due to the fact that groups have changed their working habits: “At 
a working level, all advisors and staff had established good relations with the Socialists. 
Suddenly we had to change the way of doing.”40 
 
                                                 
40 Interview with staff (1) working in the Parliamentary Work Service, European People's Party group, European 
Parliament, Brussels, 13 April 2018. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of coalition formation by year (legislation/section) 
The story is different for non-legislative reports, where the evolution regarding 
sections is statistically relevant for every coalition (Table 2). After the breakdown of the 
agreement, amendments have been less likely to be adopted by a grand coalition. The trend is 
similar (even more radical) for the grand coalition without the ALDE group. Simultaneously, 
the two alternatives coalitions have dramatically increased. In sum, for non-legislative files 
there is a clear distinction between votes on the whole text and votes on parts of the text, with 
the latter becoming more conflictual. While studies showed that political groups tend to 
cooperate more on final texts than on amendments,41 our findings show that the variable “end 
of the grand coalition agreement” only affected non-legislative reports. Finally, there can be 
important differences from one committee to another in terms of rationale and organisation,42 
leading to different consensual and conflictual dynamics once the report comes to plenary. To 
assess the effect of the committee variable, we will focus on amendments to non-legislative 
files (Table 3), due to sample size requirement. Only committees with more than 30 votes in 
plenary in the two periods have been added to the analysis. 
                                                 
41 A. Kreppel & S. Hix, op. cit.  
42 P. Settembri & C. Neuhold, op. cit.  
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 EPP/S&D/ALDE EPP/S&D EPP/ALDE S&D/ALDE 
AFET -5.5% 
(0.40) 
-73.9% 
(<0.05*) 
+371% 
(<0.01**) 
+5.9% 
(0.84) 
ECON +20% 
(0.24) 
-74.5% 
(0.26) 
-40.8% 
(0.42) 
+42.0% 
(0.73) 
EMPL -38.2% 
(<0.05*) 
-73.0% 
(<0.05*) 
+139.5% 
(<0.001***) 
+31.5% 
(0.38) 
INTA +11.7% 
(0.43) 
+575.0% 
(0.17) 
-50.2% 
(0.29) 
-100% 
(1) 
FEMM -45.8% 
(<0.05*) 
-50% 
(1) 
+831.6% 
(<0.001***) 
+18.1% 
(0.37) 
Table 3: Evolution of coalition formation by committee for initiative reports. 
 
Table 3 shows that the evolution of coalition formation is not evenly distributed across 
committees. Indeed, coalition-making on reports drafted in EMPL, FEMM and AFET 
dramatically evolved after 2017, while there have not been major changes in ECON and INTA. 
We assume that this is due to the nature of committees themselves. Indeed, a consensus-driven 
committee would tend to send to plenary initiative reports supported by a broad majority, while 
other committees might rely on smaller majorities. The ECON committee, which is influential 
within the decision-making process and drafts many legislative reports, would tend to rely on 
consensus-building dynamics: 
Compared to other committees, ECON is more pragmatic and less ideological. When 
there is problem, a solution, and thus a directive, it should be adopted very quickly.43 
Consequently, norms, processes and habits of negotiation, and interpersonal relations that have 
been developed within the context of legislative files might also impact the drafting of non-
legislative reports. 
                                                 
43 Interview with staff from the Secretariat of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), 
Brussels, 20 April 2018. 
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On the contrary, in committees that rarely drafts legislative reports (like FEMM), 
MEPs are never constrained by institutional or inter-institutional rules. We assume that for 
these committees, the end of the coalition agreement had a huge impact (the likelihood of the 
grand coalition being activated has significantly dropped after 2017 for AFET and FEMM). 
While the coalition agreement gave incentives to MEPs to work together before 2017, they 
were no longer constrained after the breakdown of the coalition, whether by the agreement or 
by institutional and inter-institutional norms and rules. Finally, the dynamic in EMPL might 
be different: the end of the agreement has reinforced a left-right cleavage that was already 
determining before January 2017. These findings confirm our hypothesis that the end of the 
grand coalition disproportionally affected parliamentary committees, reinforcing conflictual 
dynamics only for texts drafted by committees that are not consensus-oriented. 
Continuity of coalition dynamics: institutional, inter-institutional and conjectural 
constraints  
Empirical data showed that the end of the 2014 coalition agreement had no significant 
impact when it comes to adopt final texts, while it did increase conflict on sections 
(amendments and paragraphs). Our findings highlight that, despite the end of the coalition 
agreement, the EP has not evolved towards a majoritarian system. We agree with Dehousse, 
Novak and Bendjaballah44 that institutional settings and rules play an important role, although 
one should remind that rules have themselves been developed and shaped by actors.45 This 
section will analyse how both institutional and inter-institutional settings have shaped 
coalition formation in the EP and continue to affect coalition dynamics, despite the signing 
(and the breakdown) of coalition deals. It will also study how the 2014 deal constituted the 
                                                 
44 R. Dehousse, S. Novak & S. Bendjaballah, “Consensus under pressure. The evolution of conflict in the EU 
legislative process”, Politique européenne, vol. 48, no. 4, 2017, pp. 44-70. 
45 N. Brack & O. Costa, “Democracy in parliament vs. Democracy through parliament? Defining the rules of the 
game in the European Parliament”, The Jounal of Legislative Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, 2018, pp. 51-71. 
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continuity of already existing cooperation practices and can be understood as a framework of 
reference that legitimised cooperation practices. 
Institutional constraints: how the EP has formalised and established consensus-building 
mechanisms 
The data analysis highlighted that the grand coalition has remained determining when 
it comes to adopt final reports (legislation or non-legislation). We assume that this might be 
due to the fact that consensus-building mechanisms have been embodied within the EP formal 
and informal rules for a long time. From a rational choice institutionalism perspective, political 
groups have developed consensus-building rules and habits, and therefore continue to decide 
consensually, since they are arithmetically constrained. One of the main reasons is the electoral 
system (proportional), and the fact that groups can hardly secure a majority of seats: “There is 
no majority-opposition dynamic within the Parliament but one of constructive compromise”.46 
In a Parliament without a clear and stable majority, decision-making has often been made on 
a case-by-case basis. For each vote, the rapporteur needs to build a majority,47 obliging him 
or her to cooperate with members from other groups: “A rapporteur wants his or report to pass. 
He or she needs to negotiate with the most important group”.48 The need to make compromises 
has been institutionalised within EP bodies, such as committees. As outlined by the 
quantitative analysis, coalition formation has not changed for reports drafted in committees 
used to consensus building. As stated by the EPP group, “In committees where MEPs were 
already cooperating with each other before 2014, like ENVI, TRAN or ITRE, the agreement 
deal in 2014 had no impact”.49 Moreover, because of the use of expertise, which is important 
                                                 
46 Interview with an official from the European Commission, Secretariat General, Directorate F (Relations with 
other institutions), 27 March 2018, Brussels. 
47 Interview with an official from the ECON committee, 20 April 2018; Brussels. 
48 Interview with Javier Moreno Sancher, Secretary General of the S&D political group, 22 March 2018, Brussels. 
49 Interview with an official (1) from the EPP political group, Parliamentary Work Unit, 21 March 2018, Brussels. 
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for compromise-building, 50  Members tends to be socialised at the committee level, 51 
triggering committee-based loyalty. This socialisation tends to produce long-lasting effects, 
reducing the impact of the breakdown of the deal. The representation of the MEP as an expert, 
which has been socially constructed, 52  can explain why committees work consensually 
“regardless of the procedure applied”. 53  Moreover, from a rational point of view, 
parliamentarians have an interest in making compromises with other groups, if they want to 
get rewards. 54  The whole organisation of committee work is based on consensus: the 
coordinator's role is to flag up conflictual issues and the shadow rapporteur’s aim is to find an 
agreement with the rapporteur.55 Moreover, socialisation to the EP's norms and habits can take 
time, and newcomers may find difficult to enter into EU negotiations, as opposed to MEPs 
with established patterns of social interaction.56 Talking about a file that failed to pass in 
committee, an official working in ECON explain some of the reasons:  
The shadow rapporteur (from S&D) did not understood that compromises were crucial 
for a legislation to pass. He was a new MEP who had worked in academia, and 
therefore was not used to compromise-making.57 
A parliamentary committee is managed by a secretariat, which can play a role in 
reaching agreements.58 The officials working in the secretariat have contacts with officials 
from the European Commission and have developed an extensive expertise of a field. 59 
Therefore, despite coalition agreements, the secretariat brings continuity,60 especially given 
                                                 
50  S. Synnøve & L. Hermansen, “(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European 
Parliament”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, 2018, pp. 148-172. See also O. Costa, op. cit., pp. 
460-466. 
51 S. Bendjaballah, op. cit, p. 61. 
52 W. Beauvallet & S. Michon, “Des eurodéputés ‘experts’ ? Sociologie d’une illusion bien fondée”, Cultures & 
Conflits, vol. 85-86, 2012. 
53 P. Settembri & C. Neuhold, op. cit.  
54 S. Bendjaballah, op. cit, p. 82. 
55 P. Settembri & C. Neuhold, op. cit. 
56 A. Kreppel & S. Hix, “From ‘grand coalition’ to left-right confrontation. Explaining the shifting structure of 
party competition in the European Parliament”, op. cit. 
57 Interview with an official from the ECON committee, op. cit. 
58 Interview with an official from the ECON committee, op. cit. 
59 O. Costa, Le Parlement européen, assemblée délibérante, op. cit., p. 342. 
60 F. Desage, “Un régime de grande coalition permanente? Eléments lillois pour une sociologie des 'consensus' 
intercommunaux”, Politix, vol. 4, no. 88, 2009, pp. 133-161. 
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that the MEPs’ turnover remains markedly high. In addition to committees, the European 
Parliament has developed informal consensus-oriented bodies where a limited number of 
actors can have a seat. These informal settings, which could have been used to overcome 
deadlock on some files,61 can bypass parliamentary committees. In 2008, some parts of the 
negotiation on the EU climate and energy package took place in ad hoc committees.62 These 
forums can also be a way of reinforcing cooperation between the two largest groups, especially 
on sensitive issues, while excluding other groups (as they are not mentioned in the rules of 
procedure, there is no rule as to their composition). The recently created Brexit Steering Group 
is for instance only composed of members from non-Eurosceptic political groups63: “It was a 
way of deliberately exclude some groups”.64 
The two largest groups have also formalised their cooperation through co-
rapporteurship, especially on important issues. In these cases, cooperation is accepted from 
the very beginning. There rapporteurs are in the great majority of cases from the EPP and the 
S&D,65 therefore “forcing [MEPs] to cooperate and agree with the other group”.66 High-level 
forums have also been used to overcome divisions in the Parliament. For example, the 
Conference of Presidents (CoP) has played an important role in the adoption of the Joint 
Declaration.67 The Declaration has been a very political document – and not technical – and 
the negotiations have been conducted between high-level counterparts. This does not mean 
that debates in the Conference of Presidents are always consensual (the outcome was forced 
by the CoP, leaving the S&D in an uncomfortable situation).68 If compared to the impossibility 
                                                 
61 P. Settembri & C. Neuhold, op. cit. 
62 S. Bendjaballah, op. cit, p. 109. 
63 European Parliament, “Brexit Steering Group”, retrieved 2 May 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/brexit-
steering-group/en/home.html. 
64 Interview with Richard Corbett, Member of the European Parliament (S&D, United Kingdom), 22 March 2018, 
Brussels. 
65 Interview with Alexander Beels, Secretary General of the ALDE political group, 20 March 2018, Brussels. 
66  Interview with Pervenche Bères, Member of the European Parliament (S&D, France), 22 March 2018, 
Brussels. 
67 Interview with an official from the ENVI committee, op. cit. 
68 Informal talk with an official from the European Parliament.  
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to adopt a resolution on the Commission’s Work Programme, one understands the role played 
by the setting: while the resolution on the Work Programme is dealt with by political groups 
and needs to be adopted by the plenary,69 the Joint Declaration is adopted by single Members, 
behind closed doors. The small size of this setting, where information is concentrated in the 
hands of a few parliamentarians and where interpersonal relations have a role, is expected to 
help compromise-making. To sum up, we argue that consensus-building processes were 
developed before the signature of the 2014 coalition deal, and these processes have continued 
to impact decision-making after the breakdown of the agreement. Consensus-oriented rules, 
discourses and norms have been developed in the EP, justified by the specific nature of the 
EU (diversity, need to increase legitimacy, technicity). These arguments are similar to those 
used in some French intercommunalities.70 These practices and norms have been translated 
into an “esprit européen du consensus”, similar to the “esprit communautaire” in France, and 
have been internalised by MEPs, especially if they want to influence policy outcomes. The 
cooperation between political groups is even more possible when the EP political sphere 
remains disconnected and autonomous from national and established public spheres.  
Inter-institutional constraints: how the grand coalition depends on other EU institutions 
The EP is not autonomous: it needs to co-legislate with the Council and cannot really 
oppose Ministers without the support of the European Commission. Analyses need therefore 
to take into account how the EP is inserted into the EU political system.71 In the legislative 
context, the high qualified majority voting threshold in the Council obliges the EP to adopt a 
position close to the Council (broad) majority. As stated by an MEP, because of this high 
threshold in the Council, “the style of the Union as a whole is consensual rather than 
                                                 
69  Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament, “Pittella & 
Rodrigues: Right-wing block crumbles. For the S&Ds, citizens come before big business – our programme for a 
pro-European, progressive future”, retrieved 2 may 2018, http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/newsroom/ 
pittella-rodrigues-right-wing-block-crumbles-sds-citizens-come-big-business-our-programme. 
70 F. Desage, op. cit.  
71 N. Yordanova, “The European Parliament: In need of a theory”, European Union Politics, vol. 12, no. 4, 2011, 
pp. 597-617. 
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adversarial”.72 This constraint has shaped the way the EP adopts positions: the EP has “less 
room for radicalism and ended up with more centripetal outcomes”.73 
The rationalisation of legislative work is a direct consequence of the need to cooperate 
for adopting legislation. With the bulk of texts being adopted in first reading, the legislative 
process has sped up, meaning that consensual dynamics need to occur during the first reading 
stage.74 Consequently, a narrative about efficiency (output and throughput legitimacy75) has 
been reinforced over the past few years, increasing the number of early agreements.76 All these 
practices have been internalised by actors and are independent from the 2014 coalition 
agreement. As an example, the internal organisations of some committees have been adapted 
to, and are justified by, efficiency: 
The five stages in a committee are: exchange of views, draft report presentation, 
amendments tabling, discussion, and vote. In ECON, we decided to skip exchange of 
views. We do not have enough time, and there is little point for this.77 
Political groups also cooperate for pragmatic reasons, which are, for instance, to have 
a broad majority in order to oppose the Council – or at least to be more powerful. 78 The end 
of the 2014 agreement can be considered as artificial, since all the above-mentioned elements 
have not fully disappeared after January 2017: “We still need great majorities in order to 
prepare negotiations with the Council”.79Moreover, the EP is related to other institutions 
through political parties. Indeed, the Council, where the left-right cleavage is rarely 
activated80, adopts positions with a supermajority of Member States governed by parties 
                                                 
72 Interview with Richard Corbett, Member of the European Parliament (S&D, United Kingdom), op. cit 
73 A. Ripoll Servent, “Playing the co-decision game? Rules' change and institutional adaptation in the LIBE 
committee”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 34, no. 1, 2012, pp. 55-73. 
74 L. Roger, S. Otjes & H. van der Veer, op. cit.  
75  V. A. Schmidt, “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 
‘Throughput’”, Political Studies, vol. 61, 2013, pp. 2-22. 
76 E. Bressanelli, C. Koop & C. Reh, “The impact of informalisation. Early agreements and voting cohesion in 
the European Parliament”, European Union Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, 2016, pp. 91-113. 
77 Interview with an official from the ECON committee, op. cit. 
78 A. Kreppel, “Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament”, op. cit. 
79 Interview with an official from the European Commission, op. cit. 
80  F. Hayes-Renshaw, W. Van Aken & H. Wallace, “When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Vote 
Explicitly”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 1, 2006, pp. 161-194. 
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mostly affiliated with the EPP, the S&D and the ALDE families. We assume that it is 
complicated for groups in the EP, or national delegations, to adopt a position different from 
the position of ministers from their political party. The situation is similar with the 
Commission, where Commissioners come from the same governing political families, 
therefore increasing the loyalty from the EP towards the Commission: “When [socialist 
commissioners] propose a text, we have to support them”.81 In this context, the majority of 
proposals from the Commission is drafted to please a broad majority in the two institutions. 
Furthermore, the EU balance of power obliges the EP to cooperate with other 
institutions: the Parliament's success remains highly dependent on preference congruence with 
the Council or with the Commission.82 For instance, the Council has agenda-setting power 
between the first and the second reading. Even though only a few texts go to second reading, 
“it can cast a shadow. If you don't reach agreement at first reading, the Council can go to 
second reading”.83 Therefore, from a rational perspective,84 the best option for the Parliament 
is to make a proposal that would be accepted at the Council’s first reading.85 Inter-institutional 
dynamics can also explain the position of some parliamentary groups and the continuity over 
time of the grand coalition. Some groups might vote for reports not in their ideological interest 
because they know the report is likely to change with inter-institutional negotiations. This is 
the case for the EPP, which tends to be located at the centre of the Council-Parliament political 
spectrum: “In the negotiation process, a lot of EPP positions are taken in the compromise 
report of the Council”.86 The EPP tends to adopt a negotiation mandate even though it has 
been outvoted on specific amendments, increasing the likelihood of the grand coalition on 
                                                 
81 Interview with Javier Moreno Sancher, Secretary General of the S&D political group, op. cit. 
82 A. Kreppel, “Bicameralism and the balance of power in EU legislative politics”, The Journal of Legislative 
Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, 2018, pp. 11-33. 
83 Interview with Richard Corbett, Member of the European Parliament (S&D, United Kingdom), op. cit. 
84  A. Kreppel, The European Parliament and the supranational party system: A study of institutional 
development, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
85 A. Hagemann & B. Høyland, op. cit.  
86 Interview with an official (2) from the EPP political group, Parliamentary Work, 13 April 2018, Brussels. 
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final votes. In this context, the continuity of the grand coalition for final reports may hide 
conflict activated during the inter-institutional negotiation phase. In sum, all the inter-
institutional constraints that came with the empowerment of the European Parliament in the 
EU political system forced the institution to adapt, especially with the rationalisation of 
legislative work.87 Even though the agreement deal ceased to exist after January 2017, all the 
inter-institutional constraints have continued to shape coalition formation in the EP. 
Conjectural factors: how the 2014 deal has been shaped by political situation and already 
existing cooperation 
If the grand coalition is independent of the 2014 agreement, why did the groups decide 
to sign it? The EP political balance has radically changed in 2014. Unlike in the 2009-2014 
Parliament, the centre-right groups (EPP, ALDE and ECR) could not secure a majority. In 
2014, the share of seats of centrist groups has decreased, while the share of Eurosceptic groups 
dramatically increased. The 2014 agreement has therefore been considered as setting up a 
“democratic” coalition against Eurosceptic political forces.88 
The rise of Eurosceptic forces in 2014 obliged centrist groups to formalise cooperation 
in a stable agreement, in order “to have a stable majority for legislation”.89 Moreover, it was 
important to avoid giving too much voice and power to Eurosceptic groups, especially in high-
level meetings (the EFDD, for instance, did not get a committee chair or a vice-presidency). 
The creation of a “pro-European bloc” (“there is a pro-European bloc that opposes the 
wrecking bloc”) 90  is likely to have strengthened the rhetoric “democratic” versus “un-
democratic”, reinforcing moralistic position of centrist groups against Eurosceptic 
forces. 91 For the grand coalition, it was important to cooperate in order to avoid letting 
                                                 
87 N. Brack & O. Costa, op. cit.  
88 Interview with an official (1) from the EPP political group, Parliamentary Work Unit, op. cit. 
89 Interview with Alexander Beels, Secretary General of the ALDE political group, op. cit. 
90 Interview with Javier Moreno Sancher, Secretary General of the S&D political group, op. cit. 
91 C. Mouffe, “La 'fin du politique' et le défi du populisme de droite”, Revue du MAUSS, vol. 2, no. 20, 2002, pp. 
178-194. 
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Eurosceptic forces become pivotal players. It was not conceivable for centrist groups to rely 
on Eurosceptic groups: “We do not work with ENF, neither with EFDD”.92 Moreover, because 
Eurosceptic parliamentarians have the tendency to boycott legislative work93 and to oppose 
every text,94 the centrist groups has been increasingly obliged to cooperate and vote together 
in committee and plenary if they want to adopt legislation.  
The rise of Eurosceptic forces is not the only factor explaining the signature of the 
2014 agreement. The Spitzenkandidaten process, establishing a direct link between candidates 
and the Commission president, was also a determining factor. Since the Parliament had been 
a strong supporter of the Spitzenkandidaten process, it needed to present a united front and to 
speak with one voice to the European Council, where some of the Member States tried to 
oppose. As stated by Peñalver García and Priestley, voting for the Juncker Commission in the 
EP was crucial to “establish the Spitzenkandidaten system as the norm”.95 The election of 
Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the Commission has been made on the ground of 
institutional patriotism, explaining why some of the Greens voted in favour.96 In this way, 
while the Spitzenkandidaten system could have replaced the “slow governance style” by a 
more majoritarian and competitive bargaining style,97 it seems that the opposite has come 
about. There is thus a mismatch between the political competition from the Spitzenkandidaten, 
and the consensual institutional design of the whole EU.98 Both the 2014 coalition deal and 
the Spitzenkandidaten process have created a new direct link between the Commission and 
the Parliament, since both the EPP and S&D could not really oppose the European 
Commission after the signature of the deal:  
                                                 
92 Interview with an official (1) from the EPP political group, Parliamentary Work Unit, op. cit. 
93 N. Brack, “The roles of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament and their implications for the EU”, 
International Political Science Review, vol. 36, no. 3, 2015, pp. 337-350. 
94 Interview with an official from the ECON committee, op. cit. 
95 N. Peñalver García & J. Priestley, op. cit. p. 169. 
96 N. Peñalver García & J. Priestley, op. cit., p. 169-170. 
97 N. Peñalver García & J. Priestley, op. cit., p. 42. 
98 A. Körfer, “Politicising the Union? The Influence of ‘Leading Candidates’ for the Commission Presidency”, 
Bruges Political Research Papers, vol. 36, 2014. 
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During the first months of the Juncker Commission, there were discussions over the 
LuxLeaks, especially that the S&D campaigned for tax justice. But the Socialists also 
voted in favour of the Commission. The S&D therefore requested a special committee 
and not an inquiry committee.99 
The 2014 agreement had some impact on decision-making. One important objective of 
the deal was to avoid unpredictability.100 Political groups established contacts at different 
levels (Presidents, MEPs, staff) about upcoming issues. The aim of these contacts was to 
exchange information and not to make a deal: “It was more predictability than deal-
making”.101 In other words, “at the operational level, there was not any attempt to necessarily 
coordinate”. 102  The coalition focused more on political discussions and exchange of 
information than on day-to-day policy management. 
We assume that these cooperation mechanisms, which already existed before 2014, 
have continued after 2017. The S&D and the EPP have continued to cooperate on a high-level 
basis after the mid-term election, as highlighted by the creation of the G6 meeting, which is a 
“so-called meeting of democratic groups, without EFDD and ENF [...],”103 where groups flag 
up what their positions are (information exchange). While during the first part of the 
parliamentary term, the S&D and EPP leaders met bilaterally, during the second part, they 
decided to include other political groups with the G6 meeting, creating new opportunities for 
small groups.104 Although the two main groups have continued to exchange information, it 
seems that it has been more complicated since 2017 to be seen publicly as working together if 
other “democratic” political groups are not on board: “After 2017, we refused to have contacts 
only with the EPP and ALDE. The EPP therefore proposed a meeting of pro-European forces, 
the G6”.105The nature of the deal was twofold: technical (seat allocation)106 and programmatic 
                                                 
99 Interview with an official from the ECON committee, op. cit. 
100 Interview with an official from the ALDE political group, Parliamentary Work Unit, op. cit. 
101 Interview with Alexander Beels, Secretary General of the ALDE political group, op. cit. 
102 Interview with an official from the ALDE political group, Parliamentary Work Unit, op. cit. 
103 Interview with Alexander Beels, Secretary General of the ALDE political group, op. cit. 
104 Interview with an official from the Greens-EFA political group, 28 February 2018, phone interview. 
105 Interview with Javier Moreno Sancher, Secretary General of the S&D political group, op. cit. 
106 N. Peñalver García & J. Priestley, op. cit., p. 164. 
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(the programme presented by Jean-Claude Juncker was centrist 107  and included policies 
proposed by the S&D group, like the investment plan).108 These two elements were central in 
2017 when the S&D decided to breakdown the agreement:  
The EPP announced that it will present a candidate for the EP presidency. So we 
decided to stop the cooperation, especially that the Juncker Commission was not 
making sufficient progress on social issues.109  
Looking at these two elements, one could say that there has been no radical change 
since the breakdown of the deal. One the one hand, the seat allocation has remained similar 
(the distribution within the EP in January 2017 was part of an agreement).110 As for ideology, 
the data analysis underlined that the three groups have continued to adopt consensually 
legislative and non-legislative files. 
Finally, while coalition agreements generally include provisions related to formal 
and/or informal rules, commitments for decision-making, or sanction mechanisms,111 this was 
not the case for the 2014 coalition deal. We assume that political groups did not see the need 
to create new mechanisms for the daily management of the coalition because parliamentarians 
had already integrated the consensus norm, and compromise-making bodies were already in 
place in the EP. The 2014 agreement only symbolically formalised consensual practices that 
already existed before 2014.  
From a constructivist perspective, one can say that the 2014 agreement has created an 
interpretative framework for inter-group relations, in other words an element build by actors 
and to which actors can refer when producing discourses and cooperating with each other. The 
agreement constituted a framework for interaction and cooperation, thus facilitating working 
relations between MEPs. This interpretative framework became the framework of reference 
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for centrist political groups, and parliamentarians and political groups’ staff could refer to the 
coalition when working together. 112  In this context, alternative coalitions were rarely 
mentioned. This slightly changed after the end of the agreement. Some national delegations 
officially asked for adopting a new strategy, such as the French Socialist delegation that was 
in favour of a cooperation first with the Greens-EFA and the GUE/NGL. An analysis of inter-
group cohesion when the grand coalition is activated would, in this regard, be much 
appreciated. Publicly, the two largest groups describe a post-2017 situation where contacts 
have not been made firstly with the EPP or the S&D, but with ALDE, the Greens or the GUE, 
in order to create alternative coalitions: “It is not the S&D first any longer. We are looking at 
ALDE and ECR”.113 Both the EPP and the S&D seem to have refocused on other political 
groups. However, because of the constraints above-mentioned (institutional, inter-
institutional, socialisation, and arithmetic), the formation of an alternative coalition continues 
to be very complicated, explaining why the grand coalition has remained determining when it 
comes to voting: “The only stable majority is the grand coalition. Alternative coalitions are 
still very complicated to use”.114  
 
Conclusion 
As expected, legislative and non-legislative reports have continued to be adopted by the grand 
coalition after the breakdown of the coalition deal. In this regard, the decision of the S&D 
group to put an end to the deal had no impact on day-to-day decision-making in the European 
Parliament, which has remained very consensual, following the findings of Bendjaballah, 
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Novak and Rozenberg.115 The major evolution concerns votes on non-legislative amendments, 
where groups have fought with again each other more frequently after 2017 than before. 
This research shows that coalition formation is very much linked to institutional and 
inter-institutional constraints. The grand coalition has continued to be determining for 
adopting reports due to the “minority” nature of the European Parliament. In addition, the EP 
has always tried to adopt legislation, or negotiation mandate, with a broad majority in order to 
present a united front in defending its arguments before the Council.  
This research also underlines the sociological aspect of these constraints. Institutional 
and inter-institutional constrains have indeed been interiorised over time. The relationships 
between MEPs from different groups, as well as the committee-based loyalty, can explain why 
groups have continued to cooperate when adopting non-legislation. If not “factice”, the 2014 
deal has mainly been a reference framework, whose aim was to justify and legitimise practices 
that already existed before 2014. Without this framework, we assume that MEPs that 
expressed unease with the deal in 2014 could after 2017 defect more easily. 
All these conclusions need to be taken with caution. Firstly, the quantitative data is 
very limited, since it does not include the whole parliamentary term. Secondly, the main 
dataset used in this study can be biased, even though we tried to avoid this by disaggregating 
data (because RCVs on amendments can still be strategically requested by groups, conclusions 
about final texts are more reliable than on amendments). Finally, the methods used in this 
research are limited. Relying too much on quantitative data without observation can lead to 
misinterpretation. Indeed, the RCV analysis hide preliminary phases of coalition formation, 
where conflict might have increased since the end of the agreement. Yet, this analysis sheds 
light on very recent developments in the EP. While one of the main objectives of the S&D in 
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breaking the 2014 deal was to send signals to its electorate, policy-making has remained very 
consensual. This raises questions as to the democratic accountability of the EP, since the 
electorate does not really know how policies are made and which group is responsible. Some 
authors encourage political contestation in the EP in order to fill the EU democratic deficit.116 
It would be wrong to say that there is not contestation: the EP has become more and more 
politicised over time. Still, the final text communicated to the media and the public continues 
to be adopted by the grand coalition. There has always been a complicated balance between 
conflictual and politicised dynamics on the one hand and consensual and depoliticised 
dynamics on the other, and the story around the coalition agreement during the 2014-2019 
term is part of these two opposing dynamics. 
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